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Nicholas Gane 
Competition: A Critical History of a Concept 
 
Abstract 
This article expands Michel Foucault’s genealogy of liberalism and 
neoliberalism by analysing the concept of competition. It addresses four 
key liberal conceptions of competition in turn: the idea of competition as a 
destructive but progressive and thus necessary force (roughly 1830–90); 
economic theories of market equilibrium that theorize competition 
mathematically (1870 onwards); socio-biological ideas of competition as 
something natural (1850–1900); and sociological arguments that see 
competition as adding value to the social (1900–20). From this starting 
point, the article considers the ways in which three main trajectories of 
neoliberal thought that emerged from the early 1920s onwards – Austrian, 
German and American – developed and responded to these 
conceptualizations of competition. In conclusion, it is argued that this 
history of the concept of competition leads to a new understanding of the 
tensions that lie at the heart of neoliberal thought, and which are largely 
missing from Foucault’s account. 
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At the heart of Michel Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics lies a distinction 
between ‘18th-century liberalism’, which identified exchange as the central 
principle of the market, and neoliberal conceptions of the market that 
emerged in the mid-20th century, which questioned this ‘original and 
fictional situation’ of exchange and claimed instead that competition is the 
‘essential thing’ of the market (Foucault, 2008: 118). This argument, 
perhaps surprisingly, has received little attention within the extensive 
literature that now exists on Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics, and the 
concept of competition, more generally, has been neglected within 
postcrisis theories of neoliberalism that addresses its politics (Hall, 2011; 
Stedman Jones, 2012), history (Peck, 2008; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009) 
and epistemology (Gane, 2014a). In view of this, this paper will look closely 
at Foucault’s claim that neoliberalism can be explained in terms of ‘a shift 
from exchange to competition in the principle of the market’ (Foucault, 
2008: 118). It will be argued that this shift is, in fact, far from 
straightforward, for the attempt to conceive of markets as sites of exchange 
and competition is not simply neoliberal in basis, and instead can be traced 
to the period between the late-18th century and the mid-20th century. This 
period is largely absent from Foucault’s genealogy of liberal and neoliberal 
reason but is crucial as it is here that different conceptions of competition 
emerged within distinct but in some ways intersecting bodies of political-
economic, economic, and sociological work. This paper will look in detail at 
the emergence of concepts of competition within these different disciplinary 
settings through this historical period. This exercise will show that 
competition is by no means a ‘universal principle’ (Dardot and Laval, 
2013:4), but rather a concept that is complex in form, and which has been, 
and continues to be, contested and divisive not just within classical liberal 
thought but also within different strands of 20th-century neoliberalism. 
This paper, then, will seek to add to and extend the history of 
neoliberalism advanced by Foucault in his lectures on biopolitics by 
addressing the emergence and operation of one of its key governmental 
concepts: competition. This exercise will not be concerned explicitly with 
whether or not Foucault sympathized with the neoliberal ideas and 
concepts in question (see Zamora and Behrent, 2015), as this is an issue I 
have addressed elsewhere (see Gane, 2018), but rather with using 
Foucault’s work productively as a means for advancing a more detailed and 
nuanced history of neoliberalism that extends into the present. This work 
will centre on the concept of competition, not what Kenneth Dennis (1975: 
3–7) has called ‘the phenomenon of competitive striving as it happens in 
the real world’, or with other words or ‘linguistic labels’ that may have been 
used in the past in the attempt to describe such activity. The aim of this 
approach is to examine concepts of competition from the late-18th century 
onwards, and to consider their role in emergent forms of economic, political 
and sociological knowledge that deployed these concepts for descriptive, 
analytical and, in some cases, normative purposes. This paper identifies 
and, in turn, considers four key conceptual understandings of competition: 
first, political-economic ideas of competition as a destructive but 
progressive and thus necessary force (roughly through the period 1830-
90); second, more formal economic theories of market equilibrium that 
sought to theorize competition mathematically and, for the most part, use it 
as a heuristic device (mainly from 1870 onwards); third, socio-biological 
conceptions of competition as something that is natural and thus desirable 
(from 1850–1900); and finally, sociological work that questions whether 
competition is natural or social and, beyond this, the normative value it 
adds to the social world (from 1900–20). 
This historical work is by no means exhaustive. It does not cover, for 
example, ideas of competition that emerged in late-19th-century economics 
that have been addressed in detail by Morgan (1993), and which are only 
of marginal significance to the consideration of later forms of neoliberal 
thought. Instead, the task is to expand Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberal 
reason by examining the role of concepts of competition within 19th and 
early-20th-century liberal discourse, and to consider, in turn, their life within 
different trajectories of neoliberalism that followed. In so doing, this paper 
will problematize Foucault’s neat contrast between liberal and neoliberal 
forms of governmentality, which are said to be grounded in market 
principles of exchange and competition respectively. It will do so by 
questioning the normative status of concepts of competition within liberal 
and neoliberal thought; an exercise that will draw on the work of Will Davies 
in order to question the paradoxical basis of competition as something that 
‘hovers’ in the space between justice and violence (2014: 66). This 
consideration of the normative basis of competition will be central to the 
second half of this paper, which extends Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberal 
reason by analysing the ways in which the main trajectories of 
neoliberalism – Austrian, German and American – developed and 
responded to prior conceptualizations of competition in quite different ways. 
This analysis will show that Foucault’s account of different national 
trajectories of neoliberalism needs to be broadened to include a wider 
range of work and figures (many of which changed their positions over 
time), and, more than this, to consider the ways in which the concept of 
competition divided key liberal and then neoliberal thinkers over its 
potential usages and limitations. 
 
Competition: Destructive or Progressive? 
 
The first problem to be confronted in tracing the history of the concept of 
competition is where to begin. One possibility is to begin where Foucault 
concludes his lectures on biopolitics, with the work of Adam Smith. This is 
the preference of George Stigler (1957), the neoliberal economist and 
president of the Mont Pelerin Society from 1976–8, who in one of the few 
existing histories of competition argues that The Wealth of Nations provides 
both a definition of this concept – the idea that competition takes the form 
of a ‘rivalry in a race’ – as well as a way of thinking about its role in the 
economy as both a ‘process of responding to a new force and a method of 
reaching a new equilibrium’ (1957: 1–2). This paper, however, takes a 
different view: that beyond arguing that any exercise of governmental 
privilege through the mercantile system will necessarily lead to the creation 
of monopoly positions and a reduction in competitiveness (the East India 
Company is his main example; see Watson, 2017, for a useful overview; on 
the pre-history of Smith’s position and the influence of the physiocrats see 
Dennis, 1975: 43–90), Smith says very little in this text about the concept of 
competition and its workings. He simply states that markets are 
characterized by competition over price between buyers and sellers in 
relation to the supply of and demand for particular commodities. Smith’s 
understanding of competition in markets is commonsensical and yet 
enduring: that where there is competition between buyers over a 
commodity (i.e. where there is scarcity) price will go up, and where there is 
competition between sellers (i.e. where there is oversupply) it will go down 
(see Smith, 1986: 159). There is little that goes beyond this basic 
understanding of competition in relation to price in early 19th-century 
political economy. For while David Ricardo made reference to a general 
law of competition in correspondence with Thomas Malthus in 1811 (see 
Dennis, 1975: 113), and subsequently addressed the role of competition in 
money markets as well as the potential for labour to sit in competition with 
machinery, he adds little to the concept of competition beyond that already 
advanced by Smith. There is, for example, no attention to the idea of 
competition by Ricardo in his On the Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation (1817), and, elsewhere, Thomas Malthus does little more than 
repeat Smith’s conception of competition in Principles of Political Economy 
(1820). Thus, while it is possible to identify the seeds of a more formal or 
‘scientific’ approach to the question of competition within the field of 
political economy at the outset of the 19th century (see Dennis, 1975: 116), 
this development is only realized in any significant way at least 50 years 
later with the emergence of mathematical forms of economics (see section 
on perfect competition that follows). 
 To trace the emergence of the concept of competition, it is thus 
necessary to look not to Smith’s writings on the division of labour and the 
human propensity to ‘truck, barter, and exchange’, or to figures such as 
Ricardo and Malthus, but elsewhere: to early forms of socialist thought 
(some of which were inspired by Ricardo) that questioned the competitive 
and divisive nature of industrial capitalism from the 1830s through to the 
1840s. One of the earliest such statements is John Gray’s essay Human 
Happiness (1825), which declares that competition limits the productivity of 
labour and, with this, the capacity for tradesmen [sic.] to make profits. 
Gray’s appeal for a community based on principles of mutual co-operation 
is articulated, in due course, in greater detail by the Welsh social reformer 
Robert Owen. Indeed, Owen’s 1842 Manifesto advances a thoroughgoing 
critique of the destructive effects of competitive wage labour, arguing that 
competition ‘necessarily creates a covered civil warfare between the 
individuals who are engaged in the same profession or business’ (1991: 
358) and, more damningly, that ‘individual competition is productive of evils 
of every description’ (1991: 359). Against the commercial spirit of modern 
capitalism, Owen calls for a world motivated by principles of truth and 
justice; principles to be directed by a sense of kindness rather than 
competitiveness. 
He was not alone in questioning the morality of a society dominated 
by divisive forms of competition. Karl Marx later developed a critique of 
competition that had been advanced earlier by the cooperative movement, 
and by figures such as Charles Fourier and Henri Saint-Simon in their 
writings on socialism. In Capital, he describes competition as a coercive 
law that exercises power over individual capitalists, and adds that under 
conditions of capitalism commodity producers ‘acknowledge no other 
authority’ (1976: 477). While the intricacies of Marx’s position cannot be 
explored in detail, the key point is that attention to the concept of 
competition did not come, in the first instance, from classical liberal 
economics (for example, the work of Adam Smith), but out of dissent 
against industrial capitalism and the accompanying destruction of 
traditional forms of social solidarity and cooperation. 
 It would be a mistake, however, to draw a simple line of continuity 
from early forms of cooperativism through to Marx’s critique of competition 
as a core principle of capitalism, as to do so misses a key liberal 
intervention out of which the concept of competition is first formalized: John 
Stuart Mill’s critique of early forms of cooperative socialism. Mill, while 
neglected by Foucault in his biopolitics lectures (see Gane, 2014b), is a key 
figure within the history of liberal and neoliberal thought, and in Principles 
of Political Economy (1848) advanced one of the first conceptual 
statements on the question of competition. Mill’s position is complex for, on 
one hand, he is sympathetic to the cause of early socialism as he argues 
that the cooperative movement distributes goods more efficiently than any 
rival system and, to a point, makes labour more productive. This sympathy 
for cooperativism placed him out of favour with later libertarian thinkers 
such as Von Mises (see below). But, on the other hand, Mill openly stands 
against what he calls the ‘most conspicuous and vehement part’ of early 
arguments for socialism: ‘their declamations against competition’ (1965: 
792). Mill’s position is that innovation in trade and commerce is born out of 
competition between individual capitalists rather than from co-operative 
societies, which are averse to taking risks and only adopt practices once 
their success in the marketplace has been proven. He argues that it is only 
out of competition between ‘capable persons’, or in more contemporary 
terms entrepreneurs, that ‘improvements’ are made to trade and 
commerce. For this reason, Mill takes a position against socialism as he 
declares that the restriction of competition ‘is an evil, and every extension 
of it, even if for the time injuriously affecting some class of labourers, is 
always an ultimate good (1965: 793). Mill’s argument, on balance, is that 
competition is something to be embraced: it prevents idleness and the 
emergence of monopolies within the system, and, ultimately, is 
‘indispensable to progress’. 
 This idea of progress is central to a distinction Mill draws between 
competition and custom (see 1965: 242–8). Mill argues that the success of 
the concept of competition lies in its ‘pretension’ to give political economy 
the character of a science. For if competition can be assumed to be the 
‘exclusive regulator’ of rents, profits, wages and prices, then laws can be 
assigned to each of these domains and, on this basis, they can be 
explained according to ‘principles of broad generality and scientific 
precision’ (1965: 243). But Mill argues that it is a mistake to presume that 
competition holds ‘unlimited sway’ over all human affairs as economic ties 
and relations are still, to some degree, determined by more traditional 
forms of custom. For this reason, he argues, it is important to understand 
competition historically as it is a distinctly modern phenomenon that 
emerged through the Industrial Revolution and transformed relations 
between ‘land-owner and the cultivator’ (1965: 243). Competition is, for Mill, 
a modern and modernizing force as it rationalizes earlier forms of 
customary agreement by subjecting rents, wages and prices to the play of 
free market forces. While Mill is keen to point out that the ‘maximum of 
competition’ should never be presumed as it can be regulated either by 
custom or modern forms of law, he nonetheless treats this movement as a 
form of progress. Mill thus stands against early forms of cooperativism as 
well as the work of Marx by treating competition as a positive force for 
change that, for the most part, it is a mistake to resist. 
 
Perfect Competition 
 
The latter half of the 19th century saw a movement to redefine economics 
as a ‘pure’ form of mathematical science against more traditional forms of 
political economy, and, with this, to conceptualize ‘perfect’ forms of 
competition that can be proven, at least in theory, through the application of 
mathematical techniques. Competition, in this conception, was no longer 
tied to the concrete political concerns of the cooperative movement or to an 
assessment of the rights and wrongs of capitalist society more generally, 
but took ever more abstract and in this sense ‘perfect’ forms. The history of 
the idea of perfect competition, which has been of particular interest to 
neoliberal economists such as George Stigler (1957), can be traced to 
figures such as Augustin Cournot (1801–77), who saw market equilibrium 
emerging out of the competition over the volume of production, and to 
William Jevons (1835–82), who, in The Principles of Political Economy 
(1871), advanced an idea of ‘perfectly free competition’ in exchange and 
argued that competition provided an answer to the emergence of 
monopolies within different markets. The idea of perfect competition was 
developed more fully, in turn, by figures such as Francis Edgeworth (1845–
1926) and Leon Walras (1834–1910). Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics 
(1881), his key work on this subject, attempts to demarcate a ‘perfect field 
of competition’ by addressing the freedom of the individual to contract and 
re-contract relations with other economic partners, both with and without 
the consent of other parties. The main contribution of this work is its 
argument that ‘Equilibrium is attained when the existing contracts can 
neither be varied without recontract with the consent of the existing parties, 
nor by recontract within the field of competition’ (Edgeworth, 1881: 31). 
This leads Edgeworth to advance a general principle: that while a contract 
without competition is indeterminate as it involves settlements that cannot 
be varied through the introduction of other parties, a contract with 
competition is perfectly determinate because it can be explained through 
the application of a mathematical calculus that presupposes the indefinite 
‘multiplicity and dividedness’ of the competitive field (see 1881: 16–19 for 
further explanation of this distinction). 
Whereas Edgeworth’s writings have occupied something of a 
marginal position within the history of economics, Walras’s theory of 
general equilibrium remains central to contemporary neoclassical 
economics and is an important epistemological point of departure for 
different strands of neoliberal thought. This is perhaps surprising as 
Walras’s work, and in particular his Studies in Social Economics, is in many 
ways politically progressive in outlook. In Social Economics, for example, 
Walras attempts to work beyond despotism (the overarching authority of 
the state) on one hand, and anarchy (the unbridled freedom of individuals) 
on the other, by applying a synthetic method to the analysis of both in order 
to develop their relative strengths into a new position. This ‘method of 
reconciliation’ calls for a reconsideration of the powers of society in relation 
to those of the individual, and argues that, in key respects, we should work 
to ‘correct the encroachments of the individual’ into territory that should be 
occupied by the powers of the state. Walras calls this position ‘my 
socialism’ (2010: 107) – a position that clearly distances him from the raw 
individualism of later forms of neoliberalism, alongside any project for the 
redesign of the state to support the economic interests of the market.  
Walras’s work, unfortunately, is read less today because of its 
underlying politics than because of a quite different argument: that politics 
and ethics need not be part of economics per se. In Elements of 
Theoretical Economics, Walras follows Kant (without acknowledgement) in 
dividing economics into three branches: a ‘pure’ mathematical science 
concerned with abstract questions of truth; an art that has prescriptive 
value and is judged by its ‘usefulness’; and an ethics that addresses 
matters of justice (see Walras, 2014: 11–19 for an overview). While 
Walras’s Studies in Social Economics concerns questions of ethics and 
justice, Theoretical Economics stands against the field of political economy, 
including the work of Adam Smith, by defining economic theory as ‘a 
physicomathematical science’ that must always precede applied forms of 
analysis (2014: 27). Walras argues that the purpose of this form of theory is 
‘the determination of prices in a hypothetical regime of perfectly free 
competition’ (2014: viii). Contrary to Edgeworth, for Walras perfect 
competition is dynamic rather than static (or perfectly determinate) in basis 
as equilibrium is achieved through the trial and error or tattonnement (for a 
detailed consideration of this concept see Walker, 1987; Dennis, 1975: 
205–18) of individual agents. A key reason for this is that while value is 
something that ‘occurs naturally in the market under the regime of 
competition’ (2014: 42), its origin does not lie in labour (as argued by Smith 
and Ricardo) or utility (Condillac and Say) but rather scarcity, or what he 
terms rarete. This notion of rarete is important as it underpins the law of 
effective supply and demand and what he calls the ‘determination of 
equilibrium prices’ in the exchange of commodities. Indeed, it is because of 
rarete that there is competition over price, and competition is here seen to 
be crucial as it is, for Walras, the ‘practical solution’ by which it is possible 
to resolve the mathematical problem of exchange (2014: 66). 
Walras addresses precisely this problem in Theoretical Economics, 
which in turn is based upon an important assumption: that there exists a 
market that can be perfectly organized under the regime of competition. On 
the basis of this assumption, he employs an array of supply, demand, utility 
and price curves to demonstrate the mathematical possibility of price 
equilibrium, moving from comparatively simple situations, such as the 
exchange of two commodities for each other, through to more complex 
cases, such as the exchange of several commodities for one another. In 
each case Walras proposes a mathematical solution to the problem of 
perfect competition, but acknowledges nonetheless that equilibrium is an 
ideal rather than real state (2014: 209), and that in reality ‘free competition 
is impeded by an infinity of disturbing factors’ (2014: 248) or what might be 
called, in more recent terms, externalities. This recognition of the ideal-
typical rather than descriptive or politically normative basis of equilibrium 
theory is important, and through the course of Theoretical Economics 
Walras struggles to maintain a separation of pure mathematical economics 
from its artistic and ethical forms. Towards the conclusion of this book, for 
example, he declares that free competition is not the only possible system 
of economic organization (2014: 438), and that ‘an economic society’ 
cannot function without the intervention of the state (2014: 456). Not 
everyone, however, agreed with this introduction of political concerns into 
theoretical economics. Indeed, through the mid-20th century, key 
proponents of theoretical economics, such as Kenneth Arrow and Gerard 
Debreu, revisited these boundaries between pure and applied economics, 
and, by way of response, formulated ever ‘purer’ mathematical proofs of 
perfect competition and general equilibrium distanced from the practical 
and political problems of the empirical world (for an overview of this new 
attempt to ‘find equilibrium’ see Duppe and Weintraub, 2014). 
 
Competition as Natural 
 
The 19th century also saw the emergence of new approaches to the 
question of competition that drew on the science of biology rather than 
mathematics. The key text here is Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species, first 
published in 1859, in which natural selection is treated as something that 
unfolds through competition between and within different species. Darwin 
summarizes the main theoretical argument of this book in the following 
passage: 
 
As the individuals of the same species come in all respects into the closest 
competition with each other, the struggle will generally be most severe 
between them; it will be almost equally severe between the varieties of the 
same species, and next in severity between the species of the same 
genus. (1960: 433) 
 
Darwin’s work on natural selection and competition not only transformed 
the emergent discipline of biology but was also a key influence on the 
development of evolutionary approaches to the study of society, economics 
and culture through the second half of the 19th century. The main figure to 
advance such evolutionist thinking was Herbert Spencer, who after reading 
The Origin of Species coined the term ‘survival of the fittest’ in his 1864 
book Principles of Biology. While the term competition rarely features in this 
work on biology, it is a concept that Spencer developed subsequently in his 
writings on sociology, politics and justice, and this, to some extent, marks a 
break with previous key works such as Social Statics (1851), which do not 
address questions of evolution and competition explicitly. 
For Spencer, evolution is a universal phenomenon that involves a 
movement from the simple (undifferentiated) to the complex 
(heterogeneous) in every form of lived existence. Spencer argues that this 
movement towards ever higher levels of individuality and complexity is not 
destructive but brings about new forms of harmony as individual parts of 
discrete organisms have to work in cooperation with each other in order to 
ensure the survival of the greater (social) body (on the influence of such 
evolutionary ideas on late-19th-century American economics see Morgan, 
1993: 579–87). Chris Renwick provides a neat summary of this argument in 
relation to the question of competition: 
 
The destructive mode of competition that characterizes lower forms of life 
should gradually disappear, he argued, as highly specialized organisms 
tend naturally to cooperate. Spencer’s reasoning on this point was based 
on his belief that the result of greater complexity is a higher level of 
integration and mutual dependence. (Renwick, 2012: 74) 
 
In some ways, Spencer’s theorization of competition is similar to that of 
Mill, as it is depicted as a rationalizing force for change, or, crudely put, a 
driver of progress. But, for Spencer, progress is not the same thing as 
evolution (which can lead in some cases to dead ends) which involves a 
movement of differentiation from ‘lower’ (simple) to ‘higher’ (more complex 
types). In Political Institutions, for example, Spencer declares that in the 
natural world ‘competition among individuals of the same kind, survival of 
the fittest, has from the beginning furthered production of a higher type’. 
This same principle applies to what he calls ‘social organisms’: ‘We must 
recognize the truth that the struggles for existence between societies have 
been instrumental to their evolution . . . Social cooperation is initiated by 
joint defence and offence; and from the cooperation thus initiated, all kinds 
of cooperations have arisen’ (1882:13). In these terms, competition is seen 
not only to be a natural part of human societies (see Spencer, 1969: 72–6) 
but a driving force for adaption and integration, the mechanisms of which 
themselves change over time. Spencer, for example, describes an 
evolutionary movement of societies from lower, military forms in which 
violence predominates to higher forms of industrial society that are largely 
peaceful in basis. In his work on ethics, he explains: 
 
The welfare of humanity at large will be achieved by the prosperity and 
spread of the best varieties. After there has ended the predatory stage of 
progress – after there has come the stage in which the competition among 
societies is carried on without violence, there will, other things equal, be an 
increasing predominance of societies which produce the greatest numbers 
of the best individuals. (1896: 221) 
 
And later in this work, he goes a step further by arguing that higher levels 
of competition are both peaceful and altruistic in basis, for, in line with his 
broader evolutionary framework, competition can work not just for the good 
of the individual but for the good of all. 
Throughout Spencer’s writings, the idea of competition is only ever 
referred to in favorable terms. Spencer describes it, for example, as a 
‘stimulus’, as something that ‘impels’ us to improve, and argues that without 
it ‘social intercourse’ would lose its ‘salt’. It is of little surprise, then, that 
Spencer’s writings on biology are accompanied by a broader political 
position which stands against socialism and the regulation and/or restriction 
of market-based forms of competition. In 1891, Spencer introduced an 
edited volume entitled A Plea for Liberty: An Argument Against Socialism 
and Socialistic Legislation, through the course of which he declares, in 
similar vein to Mill, that those who revile competition ‘strangely ignore the 
enormous benefits resulting from it’ (1891: 4). In other works, such as 
Principles of Ethics, he argues against governmental regulation of the 
workings of free competition as ‘restraint’ should be internal (individual) 
rather than external (state or governmental) in basis. This is a theme he 
returns to in his famous essay The Man versus the State, in which he 
declares that government interference into the ‘law of supply and demand’ 
produces more evils than it cures (1940: 60). He insists that we nurture our 
‘best’, for it is through ‘the survival of the fittest’ that ‘superiority’ is 
‘perpetually fostered and further advances caused’ (1896: 5). Spencer’s 
key point of concern here is thus not equality but rather the improvement of 
the species by nurturing and rewarding the talents of those he calls the 
‘best individuals’. Indeed, he argues, this is the role of education: to employ 
principles of competition to hold ‘the promise of future perfection’ (1940: 
120). Competition, then, is seen to be both a generative principle and a 
natural sorting mechanism. 
 
The Sociology of Competition 
 
Spencer’s work, in turn, prompted the formulation of quite different 
sociologies of competition, particularly at the outset of the discipline in 
Germany in the early 20th century. The two key figures here are Georg 
Simmel and Max Weber who, respectively, advanced a socio-cultural 
theory of competition that in important respects retained an evolutionary 
approach, and an ideal-typical conception born out of an engagement with 
the epistemological underpinnings of Austrian economics. In terms of the 
former, an implicit response to Spencer can be found in Georg Simmel’s 
1903 essay ‘The Sociology of Competition’. This essay, in part, takes an 
evolutionary approach to the analysis of competition as, like Spencer, it 
treats it as part of a broader societal shift away from physical forms of 
violence that characterize lower forms of animal life. Simmel states: ‘What 
we are dealing with here are stages of evolution in which absolute 
competition of the struggle for existence among animals changes gradually 
toward relative competition’ (2008: 970). Indeed, for Simmel, competition is 
both a driver and a measure of human evolution as it requires energies 
previously invested in physical violence to be transferred into higher forms 
of cultural activity such as scholarship. Competition is thus a mechanism 
for integrating individuals into social groups (as it is for Spencer), or, to use 
Simmel’s words, a meeting point for the subjective and objective 
dimensions of human culture. But while Simmel’s essay is underpinned by 
a broadly evolutionary framework, clearly it is quite different in tone and 
content to the work of Spencer. First and foremost, Simmel treats 
competition as something that is part of the fabric of the social. He writes: 
‘Modern competition, which has been called the struggle of all against all, is 
after all at the same time the struggle of all to gain the attention of all’ 
(2008: 962). Competition is not a relation of force or violence but rather a 
nuanced struggle for the recognition by, or approval of, a third party or a 
‘customer’ that holds a ‘prize’. 
Such struggle, Simmel argues, is best conceptualized as a form of 
‘indirect fighting’, as in many cases competitors need not devote any 
energy to or even ‘touch’ each other in order to win. Competition is 
premised on a desire to better an opponent rather than destroy them, and, 
for Simmel, this spirit of betterment can only add value to social life. For 
while acknowledging that competition is part of the ‘tragedy’ of the modern 
world as it pits individuals against each other, he insists that it is a positive 
force that has an ‘incredible effect of socializing people’ (2008:961). In a 
key passage, he writes that the ‘negative entries in the social balance 
sheet of competition pale beside the incredible synthetic power of the fact 
that competition in society is competition for human beings, a struggle for 
applause and attention, for acceptance and devotion of every kind’ (2008: 
962). For Simmel, competition is a social good: it is an animating force that 
promotes socialization and integration by forging new relationships and 
‘connections’ between competitors and the ‘third’ parties who are the 
subjects of their attention. Simmel concedes that, in principle, it is possible 
for modern societies to be organized upon communal grounds, but that in 
practice socialism must ‘yield to free competition’ whenever it offers ‘the 
more practical and appropriate means’ (2008: 968). For Simmel, 
competition is more than simply a market form but a principle of social 
organization that should, wherever possible, be embraced. Indeed, Simmel 
returns to this point in his later work in which, he argues that conflict, of 
which competition is one form, can act as an ‘intergrative force’ both 
between and within social groups (see Simmel, 1971: 74–6). 
A more schematic analysis of the sociality of competition was 
advanced, in turn, by Simmel’s contemporary, Max Weber, whose 
sociological method was born, in part, out of an engagement with the 
epistemological principles of Austrian economics in the final decades of the 
19th century. Weber was concerned not with the theories of perfect 
competition discussed above, but with debates central to Austrian 
marginalism and psychophysics – in particular, the fundamental question of 
whether value is something that is psychological or social in basis (see 
Weber, 1975). While Weber is more concerned with issues arising from the 
Methodenstreit than Simmel, his conceptualization of competition 
nonetheless uses the terms of evolutionary biology as its starting point. 
Indeed, the first chapter of Economy and Society can be read as a veiled 
response to Spencer as it draws out a set of ideal-typical distinctions 
between conflict, competition and selection. Weber starts by defining 
conflict as a situation in which an actor attempts to impose his or her will 
against the resistance of other parties, or, in other words, one that involves 
the exercise of power. Competition is one such form of power as, for 
Weber, ‘it consists in a peaceful attempt to attain control over opportunities 
and advantages that are also desired by others’ (1978: 38). And this is to 
be distinguished from selection, which involves a struggle ‘for advantages 
and for survival’ that is not necessarily orientated in a meaningful way 
towards others (and therefore lies at the limits of social action). More than, 
this selection can be of two types: ‘social selection’, which refers to the 
‘relative opportunities of individuals during their own lifetime’, and 
‘biological selection’, which ‘concerns differential chances for survival of 
hereditary characteristics’ (1978: 38). Weber has little to say about 
biological forms of selection except that they are inevitable and thus 
unavoidable, even in utopian states that seek to eradicate all ‘manifest’ 
forms of competition. Weber’s interest lies, rather, in the regulatory basis of 
different types of competition – from ‘unregulated’ forms (the competition of 
‘suitors for the favour of a women’) at one end of the spectrum, through 
forms regulated to lesser or greater extent by the powers of government 
(‘competition for economic advantages in exchange relationships’), to 
‘strict’ forms of regulation (‘the struggle for victory in election campaigns’) at 
the other. Beyond this, he calls for analysis of the ways in which a social 
order creates the particular conditions that enable social selection to 
proceed. 
Weber advances a position quite different to that of Spencer (and 
Simmel) as he declares that ‘The fact that a given specific social 
relationship has been eliminated for reasons peculiar to a particular 
situation, proves nothing whatever about its ‘‘fitness to survive’’ in general 
terms’ (1978: 40). Weber responds by arguing that it is one of the tasks of 
interpretive sociology to explain the survival or success of particular social 
actions or social relationships at the cost of other, competing forms. This, 
he claims, has less to do with the ‘biological chances of survival’, or the 
selection of human types in either the ‘social or biological sense’, than with 
the ‘relative opportunities’ for different individuals and groups that are 
created by any particular social order. In these terms, social forms of 
‘selection’ are not to be treated as principles of causality, but rather as 
something that themselves have to be explained. 
 
Expanding the Genealogy of Neoliberalism 
 
The above section demonstrates that the concept of competition emerged 
in different disciplinary settings throughout the 19th century – a historical 
period that barely features in Foucault’s lectures on liberalism and 
neoliberalism aside from brief attention to the work of Bentham. The 
concept of competition was born out of debates in the 1830s and 40s over 
the impact of new forms of capitalist wage-labour on traditional forms of 
community and cooperation, and subsequently was conceptualized in four 
main ways within different traditions of economic and sociological thought: 
as a force of creative destruction that rationalized customary practices of 
fixing prices, wages and profits; as a means for establishing value or price 
which, under ideal conditions, can bring market equilibrium and be 
quantified mathematically; as a generative process of adaption and change 
that has its roots in biology; and as a social phenomenon that either adds 
value to social life or which promotes new forms of social selection that are 
tied to underlying power relations rather than to biology. These different 
conceptions are important because they demonstrate the central role that 
debates over competition played across political economy, economics and 
sociology through this period, and, perhaps more importantly, indicate that 
what was meant by the term competition, let alone how it might be 
championed politically by liberals of different kinds, was deeply contested 
while Foucault argues that liberal discourse was characterized by an 
understanding of the markets as sites of exchange rather than competition, 
it is not clear, on the evidence of the above, that this is in fact the case, as 
concepts of competition through this period are characterized by complexity 
and dissonance. This has important consequences for understanding the 
history of neoliberal thought, for neoliberalism cannot, as a result, simply be 
thought of as a reversal of the governmental logic of classical liberalism, 
which is said to be centred on understanding mechanisms and processes 
of exchange (Foucault, 2008: 116). 
‘Competition’ did not simply appear with the advent of neoliberal 
discourse, and different conceptual understandings of competition from the 
19th century continue to be problematic within and between different 
trajectories of neoliberal reason. To show this, the second half of this paper 
considers the ways in which three main trajectories of neoliberal thought – 
Austrian, German and American – have developed and responded to 
liberal ideas of competition. This analysis will not cover all aspects of these 
branches of neoliberal thought exhaustively, but will address the work of 
key neoliberal figures within each of these movements in order to show that 
while the idea of competition is a core concept around which neoliberal 
thought has coalesced (as argued by Foucault), the idea of competition 
itself has been divisive, as these figures align themselves with one or more 
of the liberal conceptions of competition analysed above while at the same 
time dismissing the value of the others. In each case, tensions emerge 
between and within each national trajectory of neoliberalism as different 
liberal conceptions of competition are hybridized into new forms that are, in 
fundamental respects, incompatible with each other. 
 
Austrian Neoliberalism 
 
Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics centre on German and American forms of 
neoliberalism at the cost of looking at the work of key Austrian thinkers 
such as Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek in any detail (see Gane, 
2014b). An important step in broadening Foucault’s genealogy of 
neoliberalism reason is thus to take the ideas of such thinkers seriously 
(see Gane, 2014a) and to examine their respective positions on the value 
of core concepts such as competition. While Mises is a libertarian thinker 
who advocated market freedoms rather than a neoliberal reprogramming of 
the state, his critique of state socialism and associated defence of private 
property was hugely influential on later neoliberal thinkers such as Friedrich 
Hayek. In his early work, Mises develops a position that responds, 
implicitly, to the four conceptions of competition addressed in the first half 
of this paper. From the outset, for example, Mises sees little of value in the 
work of John Stuart Mill, including his view of competition, as he argues 
that Mill, under the influence of his wife Harriet Taylor (Mises, 2005a: 153), 
corrupted classical liberalism by introducing socialistic ideals into his 
political economy in his later years. While Mises dismisses Mill’s work 
pretty much out of hand, he pays closer attention to neoclassical ideas of 
equilibrium, which, in his view, are concerned with a purely imaginary or 
ideal-typical state and so do not address the real-life dynamics of market 
forms. Mises gives this argument a political twist as he states that the ideal 
of equilibrium underpins the ‘social utopia’ of centrally planned economies 
(1981: 142), and against such a ‘utopia’ he declares the need for a free 
market society based upon a principle of competition that is to be 
distinguished from the commonly associated ideas of ‘conflict’ and 
‘fighting’. In a passage that is remarkably similar to the work of Simmel 
(although this is never something he acknowledges), Mises proposes that 
whereas fighting or ‘battle’ leads to destruction, competition is quite 
different as it is a constructive force and a ‘fundamental principle of social 
collaboration’ (on the broader meeting points between Simmel’s work and 
Austrian economics see Liljenberg, 2005). For whereas fighting is anti-
social as it makes co-operation between participants impossible, 
competition, by contrast, is said to be ‘an element of social collaboration, 
the ruling principle within the social body (Mises, 1981: 286). Like Simmel, 
Mises conceptualizes competition as a form of non-violent conflict that adds 
value to the social and acts as a force for the integration of individual within 
collective concerns. But unlike Simmel, Mises translates this directly into an 
economic idiom as he argues that human action is fundamentally economic 
in basis (Mises, 1960: 80) and that the market is the model of competition 
that brings cohesion to the social. Indeed, he argues that social competition 
is ‘catallactic’ competition: competition based on the monetary calculations 
of market actors that leads, in the last instance, to an agreement over price 
that then makes exchange possible (see Mises, 2007: 273–9). 
Mises argues that this form of market-based competition is not 
biological in form as, for the most part, it is not about a life or death struggle 
for survival but rather ‘the striving of individuals to attain the most 
favourable position in the system’ (2007: 273). He addresses the broader 
question of social evolution in detail in Socialism (see Mises, 1981: 249–
333) and develops his position further in Theory and History: An 
Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution. In this work, he argues 
that ‘man [sic] is unique in the ability to substitute social cooperation for 
biological competition through the exercise of reason’ (2005b: 26). Mises 
objects to the organic analogy used by Spencer and Durkheim as he 
argues that whereas the position of cells within the body is determined by 
necessity, ‘individuals spontaneously choose the way in which they 
integrate themselves into social cooperation’. He adds: ‘Men have ideas 
and seek chosen ends, while the cells and organs of the body lack such 
autonomy’ (2005b: 168). 
Mises refuses to adopt an evolutionary account of history (2005b: 
143) but nonetheless holds onto a strong view of human nature. Indeed, he 
aligns himself with Ricardo and Malthus (and also, implicitly, Spencer), who 
reject the presumption of biological equality and instead ‘take fully 
 into account the fact that there are innate biological differences among 
various groups of men as well as among individuals belonging to the same 
group’ (2005b: 27). Mises here stands against any theory of natural justice 
as he sees inequality to be a fact of nature, and adds that the state of 
nature is not characterized by happiness but by scarcity, or, in his words, 
‘extreme poverty and insecurity’ (2005b: 115). The success of the capitalist 
system, he argues, lies in its capacity to overcome nature, which is not 
‘bountiful but stingy’ (2009: 81), and does so by raising the general 
prosperity of all to a degree never seen before throughout history. For this 
reason, he positions himself against what he calls the ‘anti-capitalistic 
mentality’ of those on the political Left (see Mises, 2009). 
Friedrich Hayek develops and responds to all of the above aspects of 
Mises’s work. Hayek objects to mathematical theories of perfect 
competition on the grounds that they presuppose three main things: a large 
number of small buyers and sellers (rather than monopoly forces), free 
entry into the market, and complete knowledge of all factors that can affect 
market prices (Hayek, 1948: 95). Like Mises, he argues that competition is 
a dynamic process that cannot be captured by a static, equilibrium-based 
analysis of the market that has a tendency to see market actors as little 
more than ‘passive price takers’ (Morgan, 1993: 566). However, Hayek 
goes beyond this point by attempting to establish the idea of competition as 
both a political and an epistemological principle. He argues that 
competition is a ‘discovery procedure’ (see Hayek, 2002), and that 
knowledge ‘comes through competition’ as it coordinates the decentralized 
understandings of individual actors. Like Mises, Hayek sees competition, 
and with this the market, as a force of integration, but he takes a quite 
different view of the role of government in making competition possible. For 
while Mises advances a predominantly libertarian, laissez-faire position that 
seeks to keep government out of the economy, Hayek argues that 
government and the state can be reprogrammed to promote competition in 
parts of society where it is suppressed. This is a key motif of his 1947 
inaugural address to the Mont Pelerin Society, which centres on the 
proposition that ‘competition can be made more effective and more 
beneficent by certain activities of government than it would be without 
them’ (1948: 110). Hayek’s argument is that government should work to 
produce a ‘competitive order’, rather than to leave market dynamics to 
emerge naturally – something that, because of the interference of political 
forces, might never in fact happen. 
These arguments are central to Hayek’s two main texts: The Road to 
Serfdom and The Constitution of Liberty. In the former, Hayek argues for a 
market model of social organization based on planning for and through 
competition: one that stands against centralized controls on price 
formation, on one hand, and ‘a dogmatic laissez-faire attitude’, on the 
other. In relation to the latter (which is effectively Mises’s position), Hayek 
declares: ‘The liberal argument is in favour of making the best possible use 
of the forces of competition as a means of co-ordinating human efforts, not 
an argument for leaving things just as they are’ (Hayek, 1944: 37). 
However, while Hayek departs from Mises by advocating the refashioning 
of the state and government to make competition possible, he retains 
Mises’s position on social evolution and human nature. In The Constitution 
of Liberty, Hayek takes an unusual line on the former as he argues that 
evolutionary ideas were initially advanced by social scientists (it is unclear 
exactly who) prior to their development in the field of biology, and that the 
social sciences were mistaken in importing evolutionary ideas back into 
their accounts from figures such as Darwin (the finger of blame here seems 
to point at Spencer). Against such a move, Hayek advocates the theory of 
‘adaptive evolution’ that was developed by his fellow Austrian, Carl Menger 
(see Hayek, 1960: 53–5) – a theory closely allied to Hayek’s own idea of 
spontaneous market order. Hayek’s theory of human nature is more 
straightforward as it all but repeats Mises’s position. Hayek writes: 
‘individuals are very different from the outset . . . From the fact that people 
are very different it follows that, if we treat them equally, the result must be 
inequality in their actual position’ (1960: 77). But Hayek adds an important 
qualification to this statement: that by nature the capacity for knowledge of 
any human being, and by extension any form of human government, is 
limited. For this reason, he argues against the rationalist model of homo 
economicus and instead declares that the market is the ‘marvel’ that 
coordinates the lay, partial knowledges of individuals, and in so doing has 
the capacity to overcome the limitations of being human. 
 
German Neoliberalism 
 
German neoliberal thought, and in particular that associated with the 
Freiburg School of Economics and the journal Ordo (founded by Walter 
Eucken in 1948), advances similar ideas about the role of government in 
making market-based forms of competition work, but differs markedly from 
Mises and Hayek in its attention to the social and moral limits of this 
process. Foucault argues that the main contribution of this strand of 
neoliberalism, also known as ordoliberalism, is to reconceive the state as 
an economic rather than a political entity, and to do so by inverting the 
formula of classical liberalism so that the market becomes the organizing 
and regulating principle of the state, in particular, and the social more 
generally. As in Austrian neoliberal thought, competition is conceived of as 
something that is not natural but which has to be made and thus requires 
government in some form. But, in the case of ordoliberalism, Foucault 
detects the influence of phenomenology, and in particular the work of 
Husserl, as he argues that competition is understood as an essence that 
becomes the objective of a new ‘governmental art’: ‘Competition is an 
essence. Competition is an eidos. Competition is a principle of 
formalization. Competition has an internal logic; it has its own structure’ 
(2008: 120). On the basis of this, Foucault argues that, within German 
ordoliberalism, competition is no longer something tied to the ‘naïve 
naturalism’ of laissez-faire liberalism, but is something that becomes ‘an 
objective’ that presupposes ‘an indefinitely active policy’, and with this a 
particular ‘governmental art’ (2008: 120). 
There are, however, problems with this account. First, it is not clear, 
on the basis of the above, that a ‘naive naturalism’ does underpin all liberal 
understandings of the market that emerged from the mid-19th century 
onwards, and hence that the break from previous conceptions of 
competition as natural starts, as Foucault suggests, with ordoliberalism. 
Second, it is also not clear that ordoliberals’ thought was influenced in any 
meaningful way by the phenomenology of figures such as Husserl (see 
Gane, 2012: 72–94). And third, there are important differences between 
key members of the ordoliberal school and Austrian economists such as 
Hayek, and many of these differences emerged over time as different 
ordoliberal thinkers refused to follow a path of raw market fundamentalism. 
It is not possible to address the subtleties of different positions within 
the ordoliberal school but, for the purposes of the present paper, the work 
of Wilhelm Ropke can be used to illustrate this point. For while it is possible 
to turn to other figures such as Franz Bohm or Leonhard Miksch, Ropke 
was a founder member of the Mont Pelerin Society and its president from 
1961–2, before he split acrimoniously with Hayek (see Burgin, 2012: 123–
51), and one, if not the, key ordoliberal addressed by Foucault in his 
biopolitics lectures. Foucault rightly observes that during and after the 
Second World War, Ropke wrote a trilogy (The Social Crisis of Our Time, 
Civitas Humana, and International Order and Economic Integration) that 
became ‘a kind of bible’ of German neoliberalism (Foucault, 2008: 104). 
But many of Ropke’s ideas, when looked at closely, contradict Foucault’s 
broader characterization of this movement. Like Mises and Hayek, Ropke 
dismisses mathematical ideas of equilibrium, as he argues, first, that there 
is a ‘close affinity’ between the ‘scientific mathematical engineer mentality’ 
and ‘collectivism’ in the form of planned economies (1996: 17); and 
second, that competition is never abstract but always ‘active’ and 
‘workable’ and based on the ‘continuous striving of the producers for the 
favour of the consumers’ (1963: 162) – a position that is not far from 
Simmel. But unlike Austrian neoliberalism, there is little emphasis in 
Ropke’s work on social evolution, except for a notion of ‘spontaneous 
adaption’ that appears fleetingly in Civitas Humana (see 1996: 220). More 
importantly, Ropke’s work centres on the moral and social basis of market 
society – a point that is missed by Foucault in his biopolitics lectures. 
In Civitas Humana, Ropke argues vociferously for a pure market 
economy that is based on ‘unvarnished and genuine competition’ rather 
than monopolies that lead to the freezing of the capitalist system (1996: 5). 
He adds, in similar vein to Hayek, that the answer is not laissez-faire, as 
institutions are needed to create and enforce the legal framework of 
competition and to ensure that players follow the rules of the game. 
Ropke, however, goes further than this: there must also be moral and 
social foundations to market society in order for competition to work. 
Foucault portrays ordoliberalism as a doctrine within which there are no 
apparent boundaries to the reach of the market. But this is not the case for 
Ropke, who, particularly in A Humane Economy, addresses this question in 
detail. He declares that competition has two meanings: first, it is ‘an 
institution for stimulating effort’, and second, ‘a device for regulating and 
ordering the economic process’ (1960: 95). Free market societies, he 
argues, are based on competition in both these senses, while planned 
economies only in the former. But even in market societies, he argues, the 
‘ordinary man’ is not reducible to the fictional economic subject known 
classically as homo economicus, for in practice there are many diverse 
motives that can drive people toward economic success. More than this, 
there are real limits to competition and to what markets can and should do. 
Drawing on Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (rather than his 
Wealth of Nations), Ropke insists that the market and competition 
presuppose and consume ‘ethical reserves’ that come from ‘family, church, 
genuine communities, and tradition’, and which are needed before people 
‘go to market and compete with each other’ (1960: 125). In a striking 
passage, he declares that: 
 
The truth is that competition, which we need as a regulator in a free 
economy, comes up on all sides against limits which we would not wish it to 
transgress. It remains morally and socially dangerous and can be defended 
only up to a point and with qualifications and modifications of all kinds. A 
spirit of ever alert and suspicious rivalry, not too particular in the choice of 
its means, must not be allowed to predominate and to sway society in all its 
spheres, or it will poison men’s souls, destroy civilization, and ultimately 
disintegrate the economy. (1960: 128) 
 
This position, which is quite different to the one portrayed by Foucault in his 
lectures on biopolitics, starts with the moral and the social underpinnings of 
market capitalism and then moves to the analysis of economic phenomena, 
and in this sense is different to that advanced by Mises and Hayek. Against 
Foucault’s account of ordoliberalism, competition, for Ropke, is not 
something to be embraced tout court. Rather, it is seen as a positive and 
potentially destructive force that must be underpinned by an underlying 
sense of morality and contained within limits, even if it is not exactly clear in 
his account where these limits should lie. 
 
American Neoliberalism 
 
The other main trajectory of neoliberalism (after ordoliberalism) that 
Foucault considers in his biopolitics lectures is that associated with the 
Chicago School of Economics. Foucault focuses almost exclusively on the 
work of Gary Becker, and draws a line of continuity from Mises through to 
Becker on the grounds that both apply economic principles to the analysis 
of all domains of human life. A key point that Foucault skips over, however, 
is that contrary to ordoliberals such as Ropke, competition is not a key 
concept for Becker, especially in his work on human capital (the focal point 
of Foucault’s attention). Competition is mentioned in passing by Becker in 
his early lectures, published as Economic Theory, through the course of 
which he argues that Walras’s theory of general equilibrium was ‘the 
greatest achievement of nineteenth-century economics’ (1971: 5). Becker 
initially follows Walras in spirit if not form or substance by addressing 
questions of competition and monopoly through the mathematical analysis 
of supply and demand curves that produce what he calls ‘the stability of 
equilibrium’ (see 1971:89–102). Becker’s interest in Walras was not 
enduring, but another early work – a paper on ‘Competition and 
Democracy’ – is important as it reveals his long-standing political interest in 
the concept of competition. In this paper, Becker draws out similarities 
between an ‘ideal democracy’ and the ‘free enterprise system’ on the 
grounds that both ‘are efficient and responsive to the preferences of the 
‘‘electorate’’’ (1958: 108). Becker’s argument is that in both cases 
competition is restricted by monopoly, and for this reason it is a mistake to 
support government intervention into the economy as this can only 
replicate the structural problems of the political sphere. He explains: ‘It may 
be preferable not to regulate economic monopolies and to suffer their bad 
effects, rather than to regulate them and suffer the effects of political 
imperfections’ (1958: 109). The implication here is that politics should be 
kept out of economics, although seemingly not vice versa. 
One of the problems of Foucault’s account of Chicago School 
neoliberalism is that it focuses almost exclusively on Becker, and more 
specifically on his work on human capital. The Chicago School, however, is 
by no means a uniform entity, and views on the question of competition 
differ markedly between different thinkers and across generations (for an 
overview of this school see Peck, 2010: 82–133). The disparity of Chicago 
School thought can be demonstrated by paying brief attention to the work 
of Frank Knight (1885–1972). For while Hayek described Knight as one of 
the ‘intellectual leaders’ of the Mont Pelerin Society (Hayek,1960: 360) who 
taught three of its presidents (Milton Friedman, James Buchanan and 
George Stigler), in practice Knight sat on the margins of this society and, 
for reasons we shall see below, rejected many of the neoliberal principles 
that were held by its members (for a detailed account of the relation of 
Knight to figures such as Friedman and Stigler see Burgin, 2009). 
Knight’s key work is Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921), through the 
course of which he confronts Walrasian theories of market equilibrium by 
distinguishing between perfect and actual competition, or what can 
otherwise be called market competition in theory and in practice. He does 
so by drawing a conceptual distinction between risk and uncertainty: the 
former refers to threats that are, in principle, measurable and the latter to 
externalities that are singular in basis and thus impossible to quantify with 
any guarantee of certainty (for further elaboration of this point see Knight, 
1921: 313). Because the world is constantly changing and is full of such 
externalities, Knight argues that the price mechanism can never be perfect 
in a mathematical sense, and, as a consequence, markets always involve 
speculation or wagering on the unknown. 
Knight expands many of these points in a collection of essays 
published under the title The Ethics of Competition (1935). In this work, 
Knight implicitly responds to Walras by arguing that while economics and 
ethics address questions of value, the former, as a pure science, can only 
address matters of fact, and the latter normative questions of ‘ought’. He 
develops this neo-Kantian position further by arguing that not all human 
action is economic in basis because economics, as a science, can only 
address the means of want satisfaction rather than extend itself into 
judgements about desired ends. He writes: ‘All ends and motives are 
economic in that they require the use of objective resources in their 
realization; all are ideal, conventional, or sentimental in that the attempt to 
define objective ends breaks down’ (1935: 33). For this reason, Knight 
objects to the idea of homo economicus on different grounds to Hayek, as 
he argues that individuals do not act according to abstract laws (including 
the law of marginal utility) or on the basis of biological ‘instincts’. Indeed he 
objects to Spencer’s idea of the survival of the fittest on the grounds that it 
explains little about the culture of capitalist society and says little about the 
ethical problems to be confronted in choosing between different kinds of life 
(1935: 71). For Knight, a society based upon principles of market-based 
competition is not a biological necessity but one choice among many, and 
even then perhaps not the most desirable one. 
One of the most appealing features of Knight’s work is that it 
questions the normative basis of a society organized upon the principle of 
competition. In so doing it problematizes the formal separation of 
economics and ethics outlined above – a separation which Friedman 
(1953) was later to give new form in his distinction between positive and 
normative economics. In a key section of The Ethics of Competition, Knight 
lists some of the main problems of reconciling competition with ethics 
(1935: 49–54), and observes that the measurement of products or 
contributions in terms of price ‘does not correspond closely with ethical 
value or human significance’ (1935: 55). 
The question, for Knight, is not simply whether competition is a 
generative force but of the ‘ethical quality’ of what is achieved through 
competition as well as the motives that shape its outcome. Like Ropke, 
Knight is concerned with the ethical foundations of market-based 
competition. He observes that in the modern world such ethical concerns 
have largely evaporated as, increasingly, virtue is reduced to two forms: 
‘The greater virtue is to win; and meticulous questions about the methods 
are not in the best form, provided the methods bring victory. The lesser 
virtue is to go out and die gracefully after having lost’ (1935:67). The worry 
here, for Knight, is that competition is now so enmeshed in the basic fabric 
of life that, to a large extent, it is beyond question. This worry is absent 
from later generations of Chicago School thought, which instead, as 
Foucault notes, seeks ‘to use the market economy’ in order to analyse 
‘non-market relationships and phenomena which are not strictly and 
specifically economic but what we call social phenomena’ (2008: 240). At 
this point, any concern for ethics, at least in Knight’s sense, all but 
disappears. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This article has sought to expand Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberal 
reason by analysing different liberal conceptions of competition that 
became key points of departure for the development of different strands of 
neoliberal thought. This exercise has been by no means exhaustive: liberal 
political economy, classical sociology, and Austrian, German and American 
variants of neoliberalism are complex and diverse bodies of thought that 
are impossible to consider in full within a single paper. While a wider range 
of thinkers and texts could be addressed, this article has sought, 
nonetheless, to extend the historical scope of Foucault’s analysis by 
showing that competition is a key concept within 19th-century liberal 
thought, and a concept around which three main strands of neoliberalism, 
to lesser or greater degrees, subsequently coalesced. The question that 
this undertaking prompts, in turn, is how to assess the normative value 
ascribed to competition within liberal and neoliberal thought and, more than 
this, whether competition is the concept that enables a meaningful 
distinction to be drawn between the two. For this purpose, as indicated at 
the outset of this paper, the work of Will Davies is instructive, and will be 
considered here in brief. 
In The Limits of Neoliberalism, Davies (2014: 38) argues that there 
are two main sources of authority that are ‘afforded’ by the concept of 
competition: first, a ‘quasi-liberal one’ that is concerned with the fairness of 
a contest; and second, a ‘quasi-violent one’ that is more concerned with 
winning the game and hence the production of inequality at all costs. 
Davies suggests that the move from liberalism to neoliberalism involves a 
shift from the former to the latter, for, under conditions of neoliberalism, 
formal equality is less of a concern as ‘contingent inequality of outcome’ 
becomes ‘the critical feature and test of a competitive system’ (2014: 42). 
Davies argues, however, that neoliberalism is never simply about raw 
violence (hence the use of the prefix ‘quasi-’), as instead it ‘hovers’ 
between fairness/justice at one pole and inequality/violence at the other. 
One reason for this is that competition needs rules that, at least in principle 
if not in practice, prevent participants from undermining its basic dynamics. 
These rules, he explains (Davies, 2014: 60), must do two things: first, 
‘uphold the central norm of all competitions, which is that the contestants 
may not cooperate’; and second, ‘define the limit to acceptable inequality’ 
so that some competitors cannot simply rewrite the rules of the game or 
force out rivals permanently (anti-trust legislation is cited as an example). 
But, increasingly, under conditions of neoliberalism the abstract ideal of 
equality (fairness not only of competition but of its consequences) is seen 
to hinder the spirit of competition or what Davies calls ‘the pursuit of victory’ 
(2014: 62). As a consequence, the point of the game instead becomes 
victory or supremacy ‘almost regardless of how it is achieved’: ‘The rules 
and referee can be relied upon to impose minimal constraints of equality; 
the task of the competitors themselves is to maximize inequality in ways 
that benefit themselves’ (2014: 64). This explains the neoliberal response 
to anti-trust laws found in the work of Hayek and Milton Friedman: that 
monopoly results from governmental policies designed to enforce the rules 
of competitive game rather than empower free market processes. In this 
view, only ‘minimal constraints of equality’ are needed because competition 
itself will act as the necessary regulatory force. 
But how do these questions of fairness and inequality connect to the 
history of liberal and neoliberal governance outlined by Foucault in his 
biopolitics lectures? While Foucault tends to portray different national 
trajectories of neoliberalism as characterized largely by internal unity, this 
article has shown that between and within these trajectories there are 
continuities and divisions. Davies’s work is useful because it constructs an 
ideal-typical matrix – competition between justice and violence – through 
which it is possible to consider the political tensions at play within and 
between different strands of liberal and neoliberal thought by questioning 
the normative role assigned to different concepts of competition. The 
positioning of these strands of thought within this matrix, however, is 
perhaps not as straightforward as Davies suggests. To begin with, the 
‘quasi-liberal’ position that is oriented more towards fairness (equality) 
rather than violence (inequality) is fairly easy to map onto the work of 19th-
century cooperatists and Saint-Simonian socialists, who were staunchly 
opposed to the inequalities created by the competitive basis of industrial 
capitalism. But things are more complex with Mill, who, while sympathetic 
in some respects to the socialist cause, saw competition as a violent but 
necessary force, without which progress (through an assault on custom) 
would not be possible. And with the decline of political economics in the 
late 19th century and the emergence of new forms of mathematical 
economics, competition as a political principle largely disappeared. Instead, 
this concept was used in abstract ways and for heuristic purposes. This 
decline of political economy was also accompanied by the emergence of 
new sociological positions. Spencer, for example, pioneered an 
evolutionary approach that embraced competition as something natural 
and thus normative regardless of the inequalities it produced (which he 
largely celebrated). At the turn of the 20th century, such evolutionary 
commitments within the discipline had begun to wane, leading Weber to 
distinguish between competition and selection, and to employ both as 
ideal-typical concepts rather than normative ideas. Simmel’s work, 
meanwhile, is more complex as it acknowledges the violent potential of 
competition as a form of ‘indirect fighting’ while also celebrating it as a 
socially positive and thus, contrary to Weber, normative force. 
These positions illustrate the complexity of liberal conceptions of 
competition that emerged through the 19th century and can be used to 
extend and refine the analysis of liberal governmentality provided by 
Foucault in his biopolitics lectures. They can, more specifically, be used to 
problematize Foucault’s suggestion that the passage from liberalism to 
neoliberalism can be understood in terms of a shift from exchange to 
competition as the organizing principle of the market in particular, and of 
market-based society more generally. One reason for this is that concepts 
of competition emerged at the outset of classical liberalism and were 
developed subsequently through the trajectories of political economy, 
economics and sociology that followed – not later, with the emergence of 
neoliberalism. By extending the scope of Foucault’s account to cover this 
missing ground, it is possible to consider not only the ideas to which 
different forms of neoliberal thought sought to respond, but also the extent 
to which these take competition to their key normative principle. Again, the 
work of Davies is useful here, for while it might be true that equality and the 
fairness of the game become less of a concern for neoliberal forms of 
governance, the ways in which these ‘hover’ between justice and violence, 
along with the very meaning of these terms, vary considerably between and 
within each trajectory of neoliberalism outlined by Foucault. 
In the case of Austrian neoliberalism, for example, Mises and Hayek 
dismiss ideas of perfect competition and distance themselves from notions 
of social evolution. At the same time, they present inequality as something 
natural and desirable, and thus as something that should not be moderated 
by the rules of the game. While Davies argues that competition and 
cooperation are, in principle, incompatible, Mises and Hayek provide a twist 
on this position by implicitly agreeing with Simmel and claiming that 
competition adds value to the social precisely because it produces 
cooperation and cohesion. In this view, competition has a strongly 
normative basis. Indeed, where Mises and Hayek depart from each other is 
not on questions of fairness and inequality but on whether markets and 
competition are natural (the libertarian position) or have to be made (the 
neoliberal one). The question here is not the value of competition (which is 
not disputed), but rather the role the state is to play in making competition, 
at least in principle, possible. 
Ordoliberal theory picks up on precisely this point by addressing the 
role that the market should play in redefining the form and purpose of the 
state, and with this the normative framework that is needed to create and 
maintain economic freedoms. But ordoliberal thought does not simply 
follow the lead of Mises and Hayek by upholding competition as a 
normative principle (both epistemically and politically) at all costs, as it is 
also concerned with the violence that can be done by competitive social 
dynamics not kept within limits. This again takes us beyond the account 
provided by Foucault’s biopolitics lectures, which characterizes 
ordoliberalism as seeking to make markets and competition the formative 
powers of society. For key figures such as Ropke this was certainly not the 
case as he argues that the very notion of society presupposes strong moral 
(in particular religious) foundations that cannot be purely economic in basis 
(whether he upheld this position in practice, however, is another question, 
especially given his position on apartheid in South Africa. On this question, 
see Slobodian, 2018:146–181). 
This question of the ethics of competition is raised within the Chicago 
School, which again is a diverse body of thought that shifts in tone, focus 
and intent between thinkers and across generations. Becker, for example, 
does not position competition as a key normative principle in his later work 
(which is more concerned with the concept of human capital) but does 
begin his career by standing against political intervention into the free play 
of competitive market forces. Meanwhile, Knight is sceptical of many of the 
claims of both neoclassical economics and neoliberal theory. For on one 
hand, he attacks Walrasian notions of equilibrium on the grounds that there 
are externalities or uncertainties that are incalculable and thus destabilizing 
to the price mechanisms of the market. And on the other, he contests the 
possibility, again proposed by Walras, of separating out pure economics 
from ethics, and, like Ropke, asks fundamental questions about whether, 
from an ethical point of view, competition should be celebrated as the 
organizing principle of society. For this reason, among others, Knight, in 
spite of his early association with the Mont Pelerin Society, cannot be 
characterized in simple terms as a neoliberal. 
Given these complex differences between key figures in the 
neoliberal canon, does it still make sense to speak of ‘neoliberalism’ as a 
body of ideas that has any kind of internal consistency? I would still answer 
yes. The ‘neo-’ of this term signifies an attempt to respond to and, in key 
ways, break from the tenets of classical liberalism, which itself is far from 
homogeneous in basis. Where exactly these lines of continuity and 
departure should lie has been the source of disagreement between 
neoliberal thinkers that can be traced back to the Walter Lippmann 
Colloquium that was held in Paris in 1938 (see Gane, 2016; Foucault, 
2008: 160–1). The concept of competition is important because it can be 
used to illuminate the differences and tensions within and between the 
trajectories of neoliberalism outlined by Foucault in his biopolitics lectures. 
For in each of these trajectories it is assigned a different meaning and 
status: for some it is a master concept that is normative in basis (as for 
example, Hayek), while for others it should be normative within limits 
(Ropke) or operate alongside or beneath other concepts that are given 
greater prominence (such as human capital in Becker). 
In each case, this article has shown that these different neoliberal 
conceptions of competition build upon and break from the core arguments 
of 19th-century liberalism in different ways. As Will Davies observes, 
neoliberalism, depending on its form, lies somewhere between a liberal 
concern for the fairness of the competitive game and a new norm that 
promotes winning at any cost. The success of the neoliberal project lies in 
its ability to operate under the sign of the former, even if, in practice, the 
forms of competition it engenders deliver neither fairness nor justice. 
Neoliberalism constantly moves between these poles to justify the 
inequalities it produces, and does so by oscillating between seemingly 
contradictory positions: the market is a perfect and an imperfect pricing 
mechanism; human actors are both rational and irrational economic agents; 
and competition is natural but also needs to be manufactured. Philip 
Mirowski (2013: 69) rightly argues that many such ‘contradictory 
conceptions’ sit under the surface of neoliberal thought, and that, because 
of this a key challenge is to confront its ‘proliferation of straddles’. This 
paper has sought to contribute to this task by advancing a critical history of 
the concept of competition – a history that uses this concept in order to 
expose many of the epistemological and political tensions that lie at the 
heart of the neoliberal project and which continue to play out in the present. 
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